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The main idea of our paper comes from earlier industrial organi-
zation literature that has shown that the threat of entry limits the
price setting power of dominant ￿rms and stimulates the incumbents
to undertake innovations. We provide a theoretical framework of the
dynamics of competition where incumbents attempt to restrict or in-
hibit competition through competition restricting investments such as
advertisement, political lobbying, protection of innovations through
patents, and excess capacities, etc. Depending on how the other ￿rms
and the regulatory institutions respond to this type of investment,
complex dynamics, multiple steady states and thresholds, separating
di⁄erent domains of attraction, may emerge. Since the e⁄ectiveness
of competition restricting investments depend on regulatory rules set
and enforced by antitrust institutions, we show how an antitrust and
competition policy can be designed that may prevent the build up
of such a competition restricting capital, strengthening incentives for
price and innovation competition.
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11 Introduction
In the last decade the theory of competition has moved away from the static
theory, based on the perfect-imperfect of competition paradigm, to a dy-
namic theory. Competition in the traditional sense is price competition and
the deviation from perfectly competitive prices is shown to result in welfare
losses. Accordingly antitrust and competition laws in the U.S. and Europe
had adhered to the static blueprint of the perfect competition paradigm.
The recent research direction moves away from the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm, a long time framework for industrial organization
studies and regulatory policy, and stresses that the dynamics of competi-
tion, does not necessarily depend on market structure. The new direction
gives more relevance to the competitive behavior (for example rivalry in
an oligopolistic setting). It views competition as price competition as well
as competition for product and process innovation. Accordingly, industrial
organization and antitrust literature have attempted to integrate more dy-
namic and evolutionary view points into the studies. The major change of
the paradigm came from both, ￿rst, the view that entry dynamics is always
an important source of potential competition and, second, the view that
strategic behavior of incumbents may result in prices below monopoly prices
(limiting pricing) and in a drive for new product and process innovation to
prevent entry or to preempt the rivals￿strategies. As the overall usefulness of
perfect competition framework has become more questionable as a guideline
for antitrust regulation and competition policy it is still controversial what
the features of a new antitrust rule and competition policy should be and how
they should be designed for the new paradigm of competition dynamics.1
Yet, one of the essential points of the new paradigm of competition is
that, as ￿rms are exposed to the dynamics of competition, they are likely
to attempt to restrict or inhibit competition through competition restrict-
ing investments. Our paper which pursues this point is based on earlier
work by Brock (1983) and Brock and Dechert (1985) who had studied bar-
riers to entry capital to restrict competition. Yet, nowadays we know that
￿rms not only build up entry preventing capital to reduce market competi-
tion (through engaging in increasing returns activity, advertisement, political
lobbying, protection of in novations through patents, creating excess
1For further details on the new paradigm of competition dynamics, see Audretsch et
al. (2001).
2capacity and so on) but also can restrict competition through investments
that inhibit competitive behavior (for example, investment in coalition for-
mation, lobbying and pressuring for anti-competitive regulatory measures,
etc). These are all examples of investments that restrict the dynamics of
competition (price competition as well as competition in welfare improving
product and process innovation). This paper is concerned with such type of
investments.
The main idea of our paper comes from earlier industrial organization lit-
erature that has shown that the threat of entry limits the price setting power
of dominant ￿rms and stimulates the incumbents to undertake innovations ￿
both leading to welfare improvements. In that literature it has already been
shown that dominant ￿rms, as incumbents, strive to build up entry prevent-
ing capital. In such an environment of heterogeneous ￿rms, incumbents and
entering ￿rms, the dynamics of competition has been studied. The above
mentioned paper by Brock (1983), had argued that when dominant ￿rms
face a threat of competitive fringe ￿rms in the industry they will have an
incentive to prevent it. Investing into barriers to entry capital through en-
gaging in production activities with increasing returns and high adjustment
cost of investment as well as through advertising, lobbying excess capacity
and patent protection, the dominant ￿rm can create thresholds above which
fringe ￿rms cannot induce price competition and stimulate innovations.
Brock (1983) has shown that if the dominant ￿rmbuilds up entry-deterring
capital, this might produce thresholds beyond which the incumbents can re-
duce or eliminate the dynamics of competition. Commencing with Brock￿ s
(1983) speci￿c study on barriers to entry capital we propose to consider quite
general type of competition restricting investments, as above discussed, that
incumbents can undertake to inhibit competition. We then also can show
that depending on how the other ￿rms and the regulatory institutions re-
spond to this type of investment, complex dynamics, multiple steady states
and thresholds, separating di⁄erent domains of attraction, may emerge. Since
the e⁄ectiveness of competition restricting investments indeed depend in part
on regulatory rules set and enforced by antitrust institutions, we show how
an antitrust and competition policy can be designed that may prevent the
build up of such a competition restricting capital, strengthening incentives
for price and innovation competition.
In this context the antitrust and competition policy should be to stim-
ulate, encourage, and if necessary, restore the dynamics of markets by pro-
hibiting the restrictions of competition. In our context, one can view the
3dominant ￿rms as playing a game against the regulatory agencies, but the
regulatory agency set adverse conditions, as for example has been discussed
in the robust control literature (see Zhang and Semmler, 2005). Yet as our
results show the regulatory agency does not persistently have to intervene.
Below some threshold there are forces that revive competition, yet above
that threshold not. Competition policy should, through some regulatory in-
struments, increase the domains of attraction where competition takes place.
Yet, we also show in our paper that it is quite intricate to detect the superior
or inferior domains of attraction. We use dynamic programming to compute
those domains of attraction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the preliminary model, taking ￿rst, prices as constant. We present a number
of examples to illustrate di⁄erent outcomes in di⁄erent variants. Section 3
introduces price reaction by employing a downward sloping demand function.
Here we also compute the welfare loss due to restricted competition estab-
lished through competition restricting investment. Section 4 studies antitrust
and competition policy as resulting from our theoretical and numerical study.
Section 5 concludes the paper. The appendix gives a brief summary of the
dynamic programming method used to solve some of our model variants.
2 Model
This section introduces the dynamic model. In the preliminary version of
our model, we assume the product price to be ￿xed. In Section 3, we will
then introduce a downward sloping demand curve where prices respond.
2.1 Industry Environment
We presume a dominant ￿rm in an industry. We can also interpret the
dominant ￿rm as a group of ￿rms whose activities are highly coordinated. Yet
for short we will use the term dominant ￿rm. We presume that the dominant
￿rm and the competitive fringe ￿again these could be many ￿compete for
a given market demand d.2 The dominant ￿rm may have an incentive to
restrict the other ￿rms￿behavior through investing in competition restricting
2In Section 3 we introduces an endogenous product price and a downward sloping
demand function.
4capital. We here focus on the traditional case of a dominant ￿rm that builds
up entry-deterring capital.







￿rt [q ￿ C(q) ￿ x ￿ ’(x)]dt (1)
where q is output of the dominant ￿rm, C(q) is the cost of production, and
C0 > 0. Let￿ s assume a linear cost function for simplicity, C0 = c > 0 where
1 ￿ c > 0. This implies the dominant ￿rm may enjoy increasing returns in
terms of production technology. x is entry-deterring gross investment, and
’ is adjustment costs with properties ’0(x) T 0 for x T 0 and ’00 > 0. We
assume that the price of a unit of investment good is 1.
Entry-deterring capital accumulation is:
_ E = x ￿ ￿EE (2)
where ￿E is the depreciation rate.
Output of the dominant ￿rm is residual demand:
q = s(E;￿;￿)d (3)
where 0 < s(E) < 1 is a market share of the leading ￿rm with properties;
s(0) = 0, s(+1) = 1, s0(E) ￿ 0, s0(0) = s0(+1) = 0. ￿ is a parameter
which measures the e¢ ciency of the entry-preventing capital to enlarge the
dominant ￿rm￿ s market share, @s=@￿ > 0. ￿ is a parameter which represents
how an antitrust and competition policy can be designed that may prevent
the build up of entry-deterring capital, @s=@￿ < 0.
At the end, obviously, entry-deterring capital cannot be negative ￿E ￿ 0.
From the non-negativity condition, we can ￿nd a new constraint3
h = ￿E ￿ 0 ) _ h = ￿ _ E = ￿[x ￿ ￿EE] ￿ 0 whenever h = 0. (4)
Let the Lagrangian be written as
L = s(E)d ￿ C(q) ￿ x ￿ ’(x) + ￿(x ￿ ￿EE) ￿ ￿_ h (5)
3Since h is not allowed to exceed 0, then whenever h = 0, we must forbid h to increase.
Thus, the problem has a state-space constraint.






Pontryagin￿ s maximum principle gives the following set of ￿rst-order condi-
tions:
Lx = ￿1 ￿ ’
0(x) + ￿ + ￿ = 0 (6)
L￿ = ￿_ h = x ￿ ￿EE ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ 0 ￿L￿ = 0 (7)
￿E ￿ 0 ￿E = 0 (8)
(8) is the complementary-slackness condition appended to (7) which ensures
that (7) is valid only when the constraint is binding (E = 0).
At points where _ ￿ is di⁄erentiable,
_ ￿ ￿ 0 ( = 0 when ￿ E < 0). (9)
_ E = x ￿ ￿EE (10)
_ ￿ = (r + ￿E)￿ ￿ (1 ￿ C
0(q))s
0(E)d + ￿￿E (11)
6plus transversality conditions.
2.2 Optimal Entry-Deterring Investment Rules
Our primary interest is to study the optimal entry-deterring investment.
Whenever entry-deterring capital is positive, E > 0 (constraint not binding),
from (8) and (9), we know that ￿ = _ ￿ = 0. Therefore, from (6), we can have




x > 0 ￿ > 1
x = 0 for ￿ = 1
x < 0 ￿ < 1
when E > 0. (12)
Since ￿ is the discounted value of the sum of marginal future net cash ￿ ows
by increasing a unit of entry-deterring capital,4 (12) suggests that if it is
greater than 1 (which comes from the assumption that the price of a unit of
investment good is set 1), the ￿rm invests more until ￿ decreases to 1, and
vice versa. Note that ￿ is a⁄ected by the parameters such as ￿E, ￿, and ￿.
High depreciation of the entry preventing e⁄orts discourages the dominant
￿rm. Low e¢ ciency of entry-deterring investment and strong regulation en-
forced by antitrust institutions, to be discussed in Section 4, will discourage
the dominant ￿rm￿ s entry-preventing e⁄orts.
On the other hand, when the constraint is binding for some time period,
it follows that E = _ E = 0. Thus, from (10), the optimal entry-deterring
investment rule is
x = 0 when E = 0. (13)
This case arises when the market share of the dominant ￿rm is negligibly
small. In the static theory of competition this has been interpreted as a
perfectly competitive market environment. The ￿rm switches between the
rules (12) and (13) as the state of its entry-deterring capital changes.






To make the economic implication clearer, we make a 2D system in terms of




[(r + ￿E)(1 + ’
0(x)) ￿ (1 ￿ C
0(q))s
0(E)d ￿ ￿r + _ ￿] . (14)
(14) together with (2) describes our system. Figure 2 depicts the phase di-
agram of the system. In this economy, we possibly have two attractors; one
attractor in the positive region, another one at zero and a repellor is some-
where in the middle. This case causes a typical case of history-dependency
and threshold problem, i.e. if the industry tends toward high concentration
equilibrium or ends up with a competitive environment depends on how much
entry-deterring capital the dominant ￿rm has accumulated.
An industry tends toward a higher concentration of power when the dom-
inant ￿rm accumulates entry-deterring capital beyond a certain level that is
called a "threshold". If this is not the case, with a di⁄erent parameter set, we
can have a sole attractor at zero which suggests that the industry will be set-
tled in a competitive environment regardless of the stock of entry-deterring
capital by the dominant ￿rm. This is likely to happen when the deprecia-
tion of the entry-deterring capital is high or/and when the regulatory agency
imposes a strong regulation. Both cases discourage the dominant ￿rm to
accumulate and hold entry-deterring capital.
Yet, overall we want to remark here that the local analysis of computing
the number of equilibria does not necessarily imply that those are actually
reached. Using dynamic programming we will show that more a complex
behavior can arise.
We next check the stability of the system around each positive steady



























2 ￿ (1 ￿ C
0(q))s
00(E)d]. (16)
8Figure 2: Entry-Deterring Investment-Capital Dynamics
0 = E &
0 = x &
x
E
From the assumption of a linear production cost, C00 = 0 and 1 ￿ c > 0
in (16). Therefore, the sign of ￿ depends on only s00. Since the market share
s has a S-shape, s00 > 0 above the re￿ ection point and s00 < 0 below the
re￿ ection point.
￿ SS2 (the middle steady state) occurs below the re￿ ection point. There-
fore s00 > 0 and ￿ < 0. The phase diagram also indicates @ _ x
@E > 0 in







Det J = ￿￿E(r +￿E)+ 1
’00(1￿c)s00d, Tr J = r > 0, and the discriminant
￿ = (Tr J)2 ￿4Det J. Det J > 0 holds for relatively small r;￿E;c and large
d which ensure multiple steady states.5 Those facts tell that the dynamics in
the vicinity of the SS2 is a source (the SS2 is a repellor). It can be a spiral
source for ￿ < 0 or a node source for ￿ < 0.
5Proof to be added later.
9￿ SS3 (the upper steady state) occurs above the re￿ ection point. s00 < 0







Det J < 0. Therefore, the SS3 is a saddle.
Based on the information of the steady states obtained by Pontryagin￿ s
maximum principle, however, we cannot tell much about which attractor is
dominant for a given initial state of E. A dominant attractor is de￿ned as
an attractor which fetches the dominant ￿rm￿ s largest pro￿ts, i.e. the largest
discounted value of future net cash ￿ ows. To detect the dominant attrac-
tor, the dynamic programming approach is helpful. We employ a dynamic
programming algorithm developed in Gr￿ne and Semmler (2004).6 The al-
gorithm picks the most pro￿table path for a given initial state, computes the
global value function and the corresponding policy function, and can then
plot dynamics in the state-space. Combining the obtained information from
Pontryagin￿ s maximum principle and the dynamic programming algorithm,
we may be able to detect the following four possible scenarios:
1. Dominance of High Market Share: There are three steady states. Yet,
for any positive initial entry-deterring capital, the dominant ￿rm will
be better o⁄by accumulating the entry-deterring capital through com-
petition restricting investments. Therefore, in the long run, this will
entail a high concentration of the industry.
2. Threshold Dynamics: In this case, there are three steady states, but
there exists a threshold level of the entry-deterring capital separating
di⁄erent domains of attraction. The dominant ￿rm￿ s entry-deterring
strategy will be di⁄erent above and below the threshold. The dominant
￿rm has an incentive to build up entry-deterring capital above the
threshold through competition restricting investments and therefore
high concentration of the industry is realized in the long run. On the
other hand, below the threshold, the entry-deterring investment is too
costly for the dominant ￿rm and it rather lets the fringe ￿rms enter the
6See the Appendix.
10industry. A competitive state of the industry is restored in the long
run.
3. Restoration of Competitive Market: There are three steady states. Yet,
for any positive initial E, the entry-deterring investment is too costly
for the dominant ￿rm. Therefore, in the long run, it gradually loses the
dominance of the market share and a competitive state of the industry
will be restored in the long run.
4. Competitive Region as Sole Attractor: There is a unique steady state at
zero and thus we have a sole attractor. For any initial E, a competitive
state of the industry will be restored in the long run.
2.4 Numerical Examples
Let us use speci￿c functions for production costs, adjustment costs of entry-
deterring investment, and market share determination.





￿￿ + E￿ < 1 (21)
We assume a constant marginal cost c for production, ￿ > 1 represents the
e¢ ciency of the entry-preventing e⁄ort and ￿ captures the regulatory state
of the industry. For convenience, we set up a default parameter set as:
Example: (Default A) r=:02; ￿E=:15; ￿=5; ￿=10; d=10; c=:001; ￿=:5
SS1 (attractor) SS2 (repellor) SS3 (attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0 5.02049 13.6949
Investment level x 0 0.753074 2.05423
Market share s 0 0.0309098 0.828093
The default case has two attractors, i.e. three steady states. The SS3
shows 82.8% market share by the dominant ￿rm.7 Another attractor as-
sociated with the SS1 shows 0% market share. We can interpret this as a
7The di⁄erent equilibria are computed by Mathematica.
11negligibly small market share by the dominant ￿rm and therefore as a com-
petitive state of the industry.
2.4.1 Initial Entry-Deterring Capital: E0
A natural monopoly has naturally high entry barriers due to expensive initial
costs. When the industry is in the scenario 3, the initial E is an interesting
parameter. Some industries (for example in utilities, like Gas, Electricity,
etc.) have a high E0 which might be above the threshold. Then, the industry
will lead to high concentration in the long run.
2.4.2 Change of the Regulatory Environment: ￿
We presume that ￿ can be in￿ uenced by a policy maker. We thus consider
it as a policy parameter. Starting from Default A, we ￿rst decrease ￿ from
10 to 1 which implies a very loose regulation (Example A-1). The marginal
bene￿ts from increasing a unit of entry-deterring capital are now high and
the dominant ￿rm has a stronger incentive to accumulate E. As a result, the
SS3 shows 98.8% market share. Now ￿ increases from 10 to 20 in Example A-
2 which implies a stronger regulation by a policy maker. The e⁄ectiveness of
competition restricting investments is lower and the market share at the SS3
is decreased under 50%. When ￿ is 30 (Example A-3), regulatory rules set
by the antitrust agency are very strong. The marginal bene￿ts of increasing
E is very low and competition restricting investments are very costly for the
dominant ￿rm. A sole attractor emerges around the SS1 and a competitive
market will be restored in the long run.
Example A-1: (Very Weak Regulation) r=:02; ￿E=:15; ￿=5; ￿=1; d=10; c=:001; ￿=:5
SS1 (attractor) SS2 (repellor) SS3 (attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0 0.243818 2.43846
Investment level x 0 0.0365727 0.365769
Market share s 0 0.0008609 0.988534
Example A-2: (Strong Regulation) r=:02; ￿E=:15; ￿=5; ￿=20; d=10; c=:001; ￿=:5
SS1 (attractor) SS2 (repellor) SS3 (attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0 15.9242 18.7755
Investment level x 0 2.38862 2.81632
Market share s 0 0.242417 0.421675
12Example A-3: (Very Strong Regulation) r=:02; ￿E=:15; ￿=5; ￿=30; d=10; c=:001; ￿=:5
SS1 (unique attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0
Investment level x 0
Market share s 0
2.4.3 E¢ ciency of the Entry-Deterring E⁄ort: ￿
E¢ ciency, ￿, is a ￿rm-speci￿c parameter. Comparing to Default A, ￿ in-
creases from 5 to 7 (Example A-4). This dominant ￿rm has better strategies
to achieve a higher market share. The market share at the SS3 goes up from
83% to 89%. When ￿ = 2 (Example A-5), the ￿rm has only inferior strategies
available to increase its market share. At most, it can obtain only 55% of
the market share.
Example A-4: (High E¢ ciency) r=:02; ￿E=:15; ￿=7; ￿=10; d=10; c=:001; ￿=:5
SS1 (attractor) SS2 (repellor) SS3 (attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0 6.05303 13.4589
Investment level x 0 0.907954 2.01883
Market share s 0 0.0289113 0.888881
Example A-5: (Low E¢ ciency) r=:02; ￿E=:15; ￿=2; ￿=10; d=10; c=:001; ￿=:5
SS1 (attractor) SS2 (repellor) SS3 (attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0 0.997767 10.9931
Investment level x 0 0.149665 1.64897
Market share s 0 0.00985726 0.547202
2.4.4 Depreciation of Entry-Deterring Capital: ￿E
￿E can be another policy parameter. For example, one can view this as rep-
resenting the life time of a patent that the ￿rm has obtained whereby ￿E is
set by the regulatory agency. Also, another interpretation of ￿E is a obsoles-
cence rate of the accumulated entry-deterring capital, e.g. obtained patents
can become obsolete. Comparing to Default A (15% depreciation rate), the
Example A-6 has a lower rate (1%). Once the entry-deterring capital is accu-
mulated, it is e⁄ective over a long period of time, and it restricts competition.
As a result, the SS3 shows 98% market share. 100% depreciation (Example
A-7) is an extreme case. When the regulatory agency allows only a short life
13time of a patent, or the patent becomes obsolete quickly, it certainly discour-
ages the dominant ￿rm to make higher competition restricting investments.
A sole attractor emerges around the SS1 and a competitive market will be
restored in the long run.
Example A-6: (Low Depreciation) r=:02; ￿E=:01; ￿=5; ￿=10; d=10; c=:001; ￿=:5
SS1 (attractor) SS2 (repellor) SS3 (attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0 2.80561 22.5453
Investment level x 0 0.0280561 0.225453
Market share s 0 0.00173534 0.983122
Example A-7: (100%Depreciation) r=:02; ￿E=1; ￿=5; ￿=10; d=10; c=:001; ￿=:5
SS1 (unique attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0
Investment level x 0
Market share s 0
2.4.5 Discount Rate: r
The future discount rate will be high when a product cycle is short and
consumers￿taste changes rapidly. High uncertainty of future market demand
lets the dominant ￿rm pursue a take pro￿t and leave strategy. When the
dominant ￿rm has high uncertainty of future market demand, it takes the
future market share reservation less seriously. Therefore, in Example A-8,
the competition restricting investments are made less and the market share
at the SS3 is only 57%. When the uncertainty is extremely high (Example
A-9), the dominant ￿rm cares little about securing the future market share.
Therefore, there is a unique competitive attractor.
Example A-8: (High Discount Rate) r=:3; ￿E=:15; ￿=5; ￿=10; d=10; c=:001; ￿=:5
SS1 (attractor) SS2 (repellor) SS3 (attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0 7.17392 10.5523
Investment level x 0 1.07609 1.58284
Market share s 0 0.159673 0.566792
Example A-9: (Very High Discount Rate) r=:5; ￿E=:15; ￿=5; ￿=10; d=10; c=:001; ￿=:5
SS1 (unique attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0
Investment level x 0
Market share s 0
143 Restricted Competition and Loss of Bene￿t
In the previous section, the dominant ￿rm simply maximizes its market share
for a given market demand. The maximization of the market-share, however,
makes sense only with an inelastic market demand curve. In this section, we
introduce a downward sloping market demand curve, d(p). Therefore, the
dominant ￿rm faces a downward residual demand sd(p). We assume that
the market price is determined by the dominant ￿rm. The objective of this
section is to study the e⁄ects of the dominant ￿rm￿ s competition restricting
activities on the market price and to explain the possible loss of economic
bene￿ts arising hereby.
3.1 Model







￿rt [pq ￿ C(q) ￿ x ￿ ’(x)]dt (22)
subject to (2). The other assumptions are kept same. We conveniently
assume that the price is a function of the market share of the dominant ￿rm:
p = p(s) for 0 ￿ s ￿ 1 (23)
where p0(s) > 0, p(0) = pc, p(1) = pm. pc (= C0(q)) and pm are the com-
petitive and monopolistic prices respectively. The dominant ￿rm faces a
downward sloping market demand:
q = sd(p). (24)
The dominant ￿rm￿ s revenue is R(s) = p(s)sd(p). Most empirical studies
in Industrial Organization have shown that there is some positive correlation
of market share and rates of return.8 Therefore, we will choose a set of
parameters so that R0(s) > 0 for 0 ￿ s ￿ 1.
The Lagrangian is written as
L = p(s)s(E)d(p) ￿ C(q) ￿ x ￿ ’(x) + ￿(x ￿ ￿EE) ￿ ￿_ h. (25)
8See for example Weis (1963). For an extensive survey of earlier literature, see Semmler
(1984).









We share the ￿rst order conditions (6)-(10) from the previous section and
only the equation of motion for ￿ is modi￿ed:























0(E)g ￿ ￿r + _ ￿]
and
_ E = x ￿ ￿EE. (28)
16The system again has a state-dependent dynamic property with two at-
tractors or a sole attractor.
3.3 Numerical Examples
Speci￿c functions for the market price and the market demand should be




c)s for 0 ￿ s ￿ 1 (29)
d = b ￿ ap (30)
pc, pm, b and a are chosen so that R(s) = p(s)sd(p) monotonically in-
creases for 0 ￿ s ￿ 1. This could happen for a relatively small di⁄erence
(pm ￿ pc), large b and small a. We created a default parameter set as:
Example: (Default B) r=:02; ￿E=:15; ￿=5; ￿=10; c=:001; ￿=:5; pm=8; pc=2; b=10; a=:5
SS1 (attractor) SS2 (repellor) SS3 (attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0 4.14476 18.7069
Investment level x 0 0.621714 2.80603
Market share s 0 0.0120842 0.958175
Price Level 2.00 2.0725 7.74905
Market Demand 9.00 8.96375 6.12548
The default case has two attractors. The SS3 shows 96% market share
and the price level (p = 7:7) is very close to the monopolistic price (pm = 8).
3.4 Loss of Bene￿t
Assuming that our economy is represented by the default example, what will
be the economic consequence of the dominant ￿rm￿ s optimal entry-deterring
activities? Under our economic environment, the dominant ￿rm will accumu-
late the entry-deterring capital to reach the high market share steady state
under Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 if the ￿rm starts, for some reason, with
entry-deterring capital above the threshold level. For example, the dominant
￿rm may hold critical patents, have excess capacity, has attracted a large
customer stock through advertising and so on.
Using basic microeconomic theory, we can compute the economic surplus
for each steady state equilibrium that is an attractor. When the unrestricted












competitive market is approached, the total economic surplus (ES) is the










where c is the constant marginal cost of production. Note that pc = c at the
competitive equilibrium.







Thus, the deadweight loss from the dominant ￿rm￿ s entry-deterring activities
will be computed as:





￿)) > 0. (33)
The deadweight loss is always positive as long as the market demand is
assumed to have a downward slope. For example, the default parameter set
creates the following deadweight loss:
18Example: (Default B)
SS1 (attractor) SS2 (repellor) SS3 (attractor)
Deadweight Loss 0 1.07278 15.0081
Therefore, by leaving this industry as it is, positive bene￿t loss of the
amount ES1￿ES2 will be created. This fact justi￿es some regulatory agency
to intervene into the industry to prevent the loss of bene￿t.
4 Antitrust Policy
Based on the previous discussion, our question is whether any policy para-
meter can be used to reduce the possibility of the dominant ￿rm achieving
a high concentration equilibrium in an industry. We consider ￿ and ￿E as
policy parameters. ￿ can be interpreted as representing a general regulatory
environment or climate set by laws, implying regulations, monitoring, and
￿nally imposed costs on the ￿rm (through penalties, law suite costs and so
on). Also when excessive advertisement, lobbying etc. is restricted, ￿ will
be larger. ￿E represents the depreciation of the cumulative entry-deterring
capital of the dominant ￿rm. ￿E is larger when past advertisement or lob-
bying e⁄ort has become less e⁄ective due to the consumers￿taste changes or
any regulatory changes of the life time of the patent. Also the patent can
become obsolete.
4.1 Comparative Dynamics
Using numerical examples, we can see how antitrust policy might e⁄ectively
work. Default B has 96% market share and a deadweight loss of 15. In Exam-
ples B-1 to 3, a policy maker gradually raises ￿ from 30 to 50 corresponding
to tighter antitrust environment or climate set by laws. Concerning the up-
per attractors, the market share falls from 96% to 80% and then to 68%, the
price level from 7.7 to 6.8 and then to 6. Thus the market demand increases,
and the deadweight loss decreases from 15 to 11.6. When ￿ = 50 (Example
B-3), a sole competitive attractor emerges and the deadweight loss disap-
pears. From B-4 to 5, ￿E is raised as an antitrust policy parameter. When
the dominant ￿rm￿ s entry-deterring e⁄ort depreciates quickly, securing a high
market share is then a costly activity. As a result, the market share falls from
96% to 79%, the deadweight loss from 15 to 11.3. With 100% depreciation
19(Example B-5), the competitive attractor is the sole attractor. The industry
will restore the competitive market in the long run.
Example B-1: (Weak Regulation) r=:02; ￿E=:15; ￿=5; ￿=30; c=:001; ￿=:5; pm=8; pc=2; b=10; a=:5
SS1 (attractor) SS2 (repellor) SS3 (attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0 19.6056 39.8492
Investment level x 0 2.94084 5.97739
Market share s 0 0.106509 0.805265
Price Level p 2.00 2.63906 6.83159
Market Demand d 9.00 8.68047 6.58421
Deadweight Loss 0 1.73984 11.6642
Example B-2: (Strong Regulation) r=:02; ￿E=:15; ￿=5; ￿=40; c=:001; ￿=:5; pm=8; pc=2; b=10; a=:5
SS1 (attractor) SS2 (repellor) SS3 (attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0 30.5258 46.5924
Investment level x 0 4.57887 6.98886
Market share s 0 0.20562 0.681959
Price Level p 2.00 3.23372 6.09175
Market Demand d 9.00 8.38314 6.95412
Deadweight Loss 0 2.61262 9.27432
Example B-3: (Very Strong Regulation) r=:02; ￿E=:15; ￿=5; ￿=50; c=:001; ￿=:5; pm=8; pc=2; b=10; a=:5
SS1 (unique attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0
Investment level x 0
Market share s 0
Price Level p 2.00
Market Demand d 9.00
Deadweight Loss 0
Example B-4: (High Depreciation) r=:02; ￿E=:5; ￿=5; ￿=10; c=:001; ￿=:5; pm=8; pc=2; b=10; a=:5
SS1 (attractor) SS2 (repellor) SS3 (attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0 6.718 12.9742
Investment level x 0 3.359 6.48711
Market share s 0 0.120365 0.786154
Price Level p 2.00 2.72219 6.71692
Market Demand d 9.00 8.6389 6.64154
Deadweight Loss 0 1.85122 11.2759
20Example B-5: (100%Depreciation) r=:02; ￿E=1; ￿=5; ￿=10; c=:001; ￿=:5; pm=8; pc=2; b=10; a=:5
SS1 (unique attractor)
Entry-deterring capital E 0
Investment level x 0
Market share s 0
Price Level p 2.00
Market Demand d 9.00
Deadweight Loss 0
Next, we study the global dynamics for some of the above examples.
4.2 Global Dynamics
When complex dynamics, multiple steady states and thresholds emerge, tra-
ditional approaches such as the study undertaken by Pontryagin￿ s maximum
principle and the subsequent local stability analysis are not enough to study
the global dynamics. As we have stated in Subsection 2.3, to study the global
dynamics, the use of dynamic programming approach is helpful. Through
this approach, we can ￿rst compute the local value function associated with
each candidate path, and we can then obtain the global value function. This
additional information allows us to know which attractor is dominant for each
initial condition of the state variable. We here use the dynamic programming
algorithm as applied in Gr￿ne and Semmler (2004)9 that enables us to nu-
merically solve the dynamic model, compute the global value function, the
corresponding policy function, and the threshold if it exists. By doing so,
we can easily obtain a complete picture of the complicated dynamic system
and global dynamics. We here pick a numerical example of an antitrust and
competition policy ￿ (Examples B-1,2,3). Each of the following examples
has one of the aforesaid four scenarios of Subsection 2.3.
Figures 5, 7, and 9 depict the phase diagrams in the control-state space
which were constructed using the information from the ￿rst order conditions
of Pontryagin￿ s maximum principle. Those ￿gures also reveal the equilibrium
candidates of the respective equations. Figures 6, 8, and 10 show the global
value functions, policy functions and 1D dynamics which were computed by
the dynamic programming algorithm. Note that the dynamic programming
algorithm automatically picks the most pro￿table path if there are more than
two candidate paths. Therefore, the value functions in the ￿gures are global
9For a short description, see the Appendix.
21value functions and the 1D dynamics shows the direction of the 1D vector
￿eld and the dominant attractor. When ￿ = 30, by looking at 1D dynamics in
Figure 6, the arrows point toward the SS3 for the entire positive region. This
means that the high concentration attractor is dominant (Scenario 1). For
any initial level of E, the dominant ￿rm has an incentive to accumulate entry-
deterring capital and increase its market share up to 81%. The resulting
deadweight loss is 11.7. In the long run, the antitrust policy is too weak to
avoid high market concentration of the industry.
When ￿ = 40, the 1D dynamics in Figure 8 shows a typical threshold
case where arrows point to the SS3 above the threshold and to the SS1 be-
low the threshold (Scenario 2). Hence, the high concentration (68% with 9.3
deadweight loss) attractor is dominant above the threshold, while the com-
petitive attractor is dominant below the threshold. A policy maker, in this
scenario, cannot completely eliminate the possibility of high concentration
in the long run. When the dominant ￿rm has already accumulated consider-
able amount of entry-deterring capital, or when the concerned industry has
a natural monopolistic structure, the dominant ￿rm tends to achieve a high
market share in the long run. Note that at the threshold, the policy function
jumps and the global value function exhibits a kink where two local value
functions cross.
When ￿ = 50, there is a sole attractor (Scenario 4). The arrows in
Figure 9 all head toward the SS1. The regulatory rules are strong enough
to discourage the dominant ￿rm to build up entry-deterring capital for any
initial level of E.10
Changing ￿E gives rise to the scenarios of 1 to 4 in the similar manner.
Both policies are successful to reduce the deadweight loss. It is also possible
to make a competitive state a sole attractor by rasing ￿ and ￿E. Regulatory
agencies, however, have to be very careful about the di⁄erence between two
policies concerning how the deadweight loss is reduced. By rasing ￿, the
basin of attraction associated with the competitive state enlarges and the
high market share equilibrium is pushed further up. High market shares
will be achieved only with large entry-deterring capital accumulation. Thus,
the dominant ￿rm with a given entry-deterring capital is more likely to be
absorbed in a competitive equilibrium. On the other hand, by rasing ￿E,
10We want to note that there is likely to be a scenario, similarly to the ￿rst scenario,
where, however, the lower equilibrium becomes the sole attractor even though there are
three equilibrium candidates.
22the basin of attraction associated with the competitive state enlarges only
slightly. Moreover, the high market share equilibrium is pushed down. This
means that two attractors become closer. High market share is achieved even
with small entry-deterring capital. Therefore, the absolute level of E cannot
be a proxy of market share in this case. The possibility that the dominant
￿rm leads an industry to high concentration doesn￿ t decrease much by raising
￿E. [TWO FIGURES COME HERE]
5 Conclusion
This paper provides a theoretical framework of the dynamics of competi-
tion where incumbents attempt to restrict or inhibit competition through
competition restricting investments such as advertisement, political lobby-
ing, protection of innovations through patents, and excess capacities, etc.
We also have studied of how an antitrust and competition policy can be
designed that may prevent the build up of such a competition restricting
capital, strengthening incentives for price and innovation competition.
We commence our study by introducing a preliminary version of our
model, assuming the product price is ￿xed, where the dominant ￿rm and the
competitive fringe compete for a given market demand d. In this simple set-
ting, the dominant ￿rm simply maximizes its market share for a given market
demand. We ￿rst show that there possibly exist two attractors; one attractor
in the positive region, another one at zero and a repellor emerges somewhere
in the middle. This case causes a typical case of history-dependency and
threshold problem, i.e. if the industry tends toward high concentration equi-
librium or ends up with a competitive environment depends on how much
entry-deterring capital the dominant ￿rm has accumulated. Secondly, we in-
dicate four possible scenarios: ￿rst, dominance of high market share, second,
threshold dynamics, third, restoration of competitive market, and fourth,
competitive region as sole attractor. Which of the scenarios emerges de-
pends on how the other ￿rms and the regulatory institutions respond to this
type of investment. We present a number of examples to illustrate di⁄erent
outcomes in di⁄erent variants of our model.
Thereafter we endogenize the product price by assuming price setting
power by the dominant ￿rm, yet the price responds to a downward sloping
market demand curve, d(p). Therefore, the dominant ￿rm faces a downward
residual demand sd(p). We study the e⁄ects of the dominant ￿rm￿ s competi-
23tion restricting activities on the market price and explained the possible loss
of economic bene￿ts arising hereby.
Furthermore, we attempt to answer the question whether any policy pa-
rameter can be used to reduce the possibility of the dominant ￿rm achieving
a high concentration equilibrium in an industry and avoid the possible loss
of economic bene￿ts. We consider ￿ and ￿E as policy parameters. ￿ is in-
terpreted as a general regulatory environment or climate set by laws imply-
ing regulations, monitoring, and ￿nally imposed costs on the ￿rm (through
penalties, law suite costs and so on). ￿E represents the depreciation of the
past advertisement or lobbying e⁄ort due to any regulatory changes of the
life time of the patent. The e⁄ectiveness of competition restricting invest-
ments depends on regulatory rules set and enforced by antitrust institutions.
Our numerical study shows that, by changing those policy parameters, four
di⁄erent scenarios that were indicated before indeed emerge. As ￿ and ￿E
increases, the domains of attraction where competition takes place enlarges.
This means that, once the regulatory agency is successful to change the
competitive environment of the industry, it does not persistently have to
intervene.
Finally, we mention that the use of dynamic programming approach is
helpful to study the global dynamics and to detect the superior or inferior
domains of attraction.
246 Appendix: Numerical Solution Method
We here brie￿ y describe the dynamic programming algorithm as applied in
Gr￿ne and Semmler (2004) that enables us to numerically solve the dynamic
model as proposed in Section 4. The feature of the dynamic programming
algorithm is an adaptive discretization of the state space which leads to high
numerical accuracy with moderate use of memory.
Such algorithm is applied to discounted in￿nite horizon optimal control
problems of the type introduced in Section 4. In our model variants we have
to numerically compute V (x) for






s.t. _ x = g(x;u)
where u represents the control variable and x a vector of state variables.
In the ￿rst step, the continuous time optimal control problem has to be
replaced by a ￿rst order discrete time approximation given by
Vh(x) = max
j
Jh(x;u); Jh(x;u) = h
1 X
i=0
(1 ￿ ￿h)Uf(xh(i);ui) (A1)
where xu is de￿ned by the discrete dynamics
xh(0) = x; xh(i + 1) = xh(i) + hg(xi;ui) (A2)
and h > 0 is the discretization time step. Note that j = (ji)i2N0 here
denotes a discrete control sequence.
The optimal value function is the unique solution of a discrete Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation such as
Vh(x) = max
j
fhf(x;uo) + (1 + ￿h)Vh(xh(1))g (A3)
where xh(1) denotes the discrete solution corresponding to the control
and initial value x after one time step h. Abbreviating
Th(Vh)(x) = max
j
fhf(x;uo) + (1 ￿ ￿h)Vh(xh(1))g (A4)
25the second step of the algorithm now approximates the solution on grid
￿ covering a compact subset of the state space, i.e. a compact interval [0;K]
in our setup. Denoting the nodes of ￿ by xi;i = 1;:::;P, we are now looking









for each node xi of the grid, where the value of V ￿
h for points x which are
not grid points (these are needed for the evaluation of Th) is determined by
linear interpolation. We refer to the paper cited above for the description of
iterative methods for the solution of (A5). Note that an approximately opti-
mal control law (in feedback form for the discrete dynamics) can be obtained
from this approximation by taking the value j￿(x) = j for j realizing the
maximum in (A3), where Vh is replaced by V ￿
h . This procedure in particular
allows the numerical computation of approximately optimal trajectories.
In order the distribute the nodes of the grid e¢ ciently, we make use of a





h )(k) ￿ V
￿
h (k) j
More precisely we approximate this value by evaluating the right hand
side in a number of test points. It can be shown that the error estimators ￿l
give upper and lower bounds for the real error (i.e., the di⁄erence between
Vj and V ￿
h ) and hence serve as an indicator for a possible local re￿nement
of the grid ￿. It should be noted that this adaptive re￿nement of the grid is
very e⁄ective for computing steep value functions and models with multiple
equilibria, see Gr￿ne and Semmler (2004).
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